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" … after the Fergana events, we were evacuated to Russia, but we could not live there. After making the necessary arrangements we decided to migrate to Turkey by car. One night we stayed in my daughter's house near Georgia, then we continued on our way to Turkey. My grandson asked me: 'where are we going to sleep tonight grandpa?' I did not know what to say. Tell me, what kind of a grandfather am I? I am not even capable of answering the question of my grandson because I did not know the answer myself. My father was deported, I was deported, my son is deported, and now my grandson. Isn't that too much? " 1 The Soviet deportation of nationalities constitutes one of the dark sides of the former USSR. Among many ethnic problems, the case of the deported and dispersed peoples is nowadays one of the most acute problems in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the titular nationalities of the independent republics became dominant in their own territories. The situation of those minorities that lacked their own territorial units, such as the Ahıska Turks, deteriorated and they have been subjected not only to ethnic discrimination, but also to ethnic violence. The present article will focus on the violation of the political, human and territorial rights of the Ahıska Turks, the preservation of their identity, and the political and strategic dimension of the issue.

Özet Bu makale 1944 yılında ana vatanları Kırım'dan Orta Asya'ya sürülen ve vatana dönme haklarını ancak 1989 yılında elde eden Kırım Tatarları örneğinde etnik / milli kimlik-dil ilişkisini incelemektedir. Kırım'da gerçekleştirilen saha araştırması verilerine dayanan makalenin temel iddiası, dil-etnik / milli kimlik ilişkisinin, dilin sembolik ve etkileşimsel boyutlarının; kimliğin ise etnik /milli ve kültürel boyutlarının birbirinden ayrılması halinde anlaşılabileceğidir. Ayrıca, makalede, vatana dönüş sonrasında başlayan kültürel canlanma sürecinde Milli Mekteplerin rolü üzerinde durulmakta ve Gaspıralı dönemi ile söz konusu olan koşutluklar vurgulanmaktadır. Abstract This article discusses the relationship between ethnic / national identity and language in the case of the Crimean Tatars who were deported from their homeland in 1944 and who obtained the right of return only in 1989. The main argument of this article based on the data of the fieldwork carried out in Crimea, is that the relationship between language and ethnic/national identity can be best understood if the symbolic and communicative dimensions of language, and the ethnic/national and cultural dimensions of identity are distinguished. Furthermore, the article analyses the role of National Schools within the cultural revival process following the return of the Crimean Tatars and emphasized the similarities with the period of Gasprinski.

The main intention of this article is to analyze the role of Islam in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and its utilization in the nation-building and state-building processes. It is argued that Islam in post-Soviet Kazakhstan is a cultural phenomenon rather than a religious one and is an important marker of national identity despite the competition of radical movements in the " religious field. " A situation of anomie became visible in Kazakhstan beginning in the Gorbachev period and increasingly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which necessitated a search for a new social order. Anomie, which was to a large extent the result of being in interaction with the dominant Russian culture and the oppressive Soviet regime, involved a feeling of despair that offered the opportunity of re-establishing the values and traditions of the past and new networks. Following independence, this feeling of despair, caused by the ethnocentric attitude of Russians who defined Kazak culture and nomadism as 'primitive' and wanted to replace it with a more 'civilized' modern Russian culture, was carefully elaborated by the Kazak elite aiming at building the Kazak nation. It is within this atmosphere of anomie that the cultural revival project has been launched. The revival of Islam is expected to play a significant role in this project and Islam is being used as one of the basic elements of culture that will contribute to the integration of the new Kazak national identity. Islam, in this context, is also used as a tool in the struggle against the Russian and Soviet heritage and is expected to play an integra-tive role. This integrative function is perceived as necessary for the construction of Kazak national identity. The cultural revival project in general and the revival of Islam in specific emerged as a reaction against the dominant Russian/Soviet culture and to a more limited extent the non-Kazaks, who are mainly Russians living in Kazakhstan. This reaction is in reality a nationalist reaction rather than a religious one. Religion in this case forms one of the basic elements of the cultural material that is going to be used to fill the content of the boundary of national identity. It is important to underline that the parallel revival of religion and nationalism is not a phenomenon specific to

Crimean Tatars have been experiencing the loss of homeland since the Russian invasion of Crimea in 1783, which caused massive waves of migration especially to the Ottoman Empire. The loss of homeland culminated in Stalin's strategic deportations. Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea to Central Asia in 1944 and obtained the right to return to their homeland in 1989. Since then, the return process has continued. Considering that the construction of the myth of homeland is an effective instrument to mobilize national sentiment, this article studies the perception of homeland among Crimean Tatars with its different layers-as an essential marker of identity, as an idealized mythical final destination, as a land where the community lives, and finally as a rationally desired place in search for a better life. The article also argues that these layers may coexist in individual cases although their relative significance may vary.

Although not a reflection of liberal ideals, the Ottoman Empire had no official language policy or policies that standardized education. For the Ottoman rulers, the main aim was to maintain power and ensure the continuation of the Empire. However, the Turkish Republic ...

ABSTRACT This article discusses the growing religious nationalism in post-Soviet Georgia. It is argued that religious nationalism and the prioritisation of nation-state building are exercised at the expense of democracy and minority rights, and thus endanger national and territorial integrity. The article also aims to analyse the implementation of minority rights in Georgia which is elaborated in the context of the country's membership of the Council of Europe and international treaties to which it is a party. In this context, the deprivatisation of religion in Georgia is also discussed together with the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the public sphere.