Sociology/ Eurasian Studies

This paper investigates the situation of bulk water transfer comprehensively to address the reasons of failure and to provide a path that should be followed to correct the misleadings. The accurate ways will have been argued by taking contradictory topics into consideration and producing solutions to them in order to achieve the success and equality in bulk water transfer. There are several subjective approaches on bulk water transfer issue, however being subjective means being unexplained. In order to be scientific and to achieve mainstream approach, there must be an objective approach which is going to be done in this paper.

Central Asian region has always been a significant geopolitical area as being a bridge between Europe and Asia. It is located in the trade ways and it connects these two regions with an ancient trade route, called as silk road (Fedorenko, 2013). Beyond its image as a bridge, it contains highly remarkable aspects of geopolitics like rich natural energy resources which having been attracted by the western and eastern countries. Along with the dissolution of Soviet Union (S.U), geopolitics of the region has started to change. Due to the crucial but limited water resources that the region has, caused water politics to play a primary role in the geopolitics of the region. Hereby, this article aims to explain, how water politics contribute and reshape the geopolitics of the Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After a brief information about the Soviet Union's effect and the conflicts in Central Asia, the importance of water will be examined in order to be able to see the picture more clearly and to understand the way that is it being used as strategic tool. Subsequent to the mastering of the significance of water, Geopolitics and the Hydro-Geopolitics of the region will be investigated comprehensively.
Key Words: Hydro-politics of Central Asia, Water politics, Geopolitics of Central Asia, Hydro- Geopolitics.

Bu analizin amacı, ülkenin 2011 yılı öncesi su politikalarının, savaş sonrasında nasıl bir hal aldığını ortaya koymaktır. Bölgede su, bir çatışma ve işbirliği kaynağı olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu analizde suyun bir çatışma kaynağı oluşu görüşü temel alınacaktır. Suriye bulunduğu coğrafi konum dolayısıyla, su kaynakları hususunda büyük bir dezavantaja sahiptir. Su kaynakları bakımından fakir bir bölgede yer almasının yanı sıra, bir de sınıraşan suların (uluslararası nehirler) yaygın olduğu bir konumda bulunuyor olması, ülkenin su arzı güvenliğini büyük sıkıntılara sokmaktadır.  Su arz güvenliğinin sağlanması savaş öncesinde, dış politika ajandasında öncelikli ve kritik bir konumdaydı. Ülkede su yanlızca bir kalkınma aracı olarak değil, aynı zamanda otorite kurma amaçlı bir siyasi araç olarak da kullanılıyordu. Gelişmekte olan bir ülke olmasına ve şehirleşmenin artmakta oluşuna ek olarak bir de gittikçe artan nüfusun eklenmesi, ülkede su kaynaklarına aşırı yüklenmelere, su kirliliğine ve ülkenin yerlaltı sularının tuzlanmasına sebep olmaktaydı. Bunlara ek olarak, kapsamlı ve etkili su kaynakları yönetiminin olmaması, su kaynakları yönetimi konusunda yetkili kurumlar arasında etkileşim ve koordinasyon olmaması, su kıtlığını azaltmak ve mevcut kaynakların sürdürülebilirliğini sağlamak olan, devletin en temel ve önemli su polikasını olumsuz etkilmekteydi. Hayati öneme sahip su kaynakları, 2011 yılı öncesinde başarılı bir şekilde yönetilememekteydi. 2011 yılı sonrasında ise, ülkenin tarım sektörü büyük maddi kayıplara uğramış, hidroelektrik enerji kaynakları ve tarımda sulamanın geniş olduğu bazı araziler, savaş sonrası ortaya çıkan PKK/PYD gibi devlet-dışı aktörlerin eline geçmiştir. Aynı aktörlerin zaten kısıtlı miktarda olan ve düzgün yönetilemeyen su kaynaklarına ortak olması, yalnızca rejimin su politikalarına darbe vurmakla kalmamış, ülkede yaşayan insanların temiz ve arıtma suya ulaşamamalarına, su kirliliğinin daha da artmasına, dolayısıyla binlerce insanın hayatlarını kaybetmelerine neden olmuştur.

According to current data, the YPG is in possession of an area of approximately 50,000 km2, which constitutes 30% of Syria’s total surface area. Among the areas under YPG control, there are highly valuable energy (petroleum and natural gas) and water resources, not to mention agricultural lands. To be more precise, 50% of Syria’s irrigable lands, 70% of its energy resources, and 95% of its water potential are in the parts of Syria that are under the YPG terrorist organization’s control. In other words, the most crucial factors that have been determining Syria’s GDP do not serve the same civilian purposes any longer. Syrian nationals have been suffering and migrating since they do not have access to fresh water, food, energy, and other related products. The reconstruction cost has been increasing and the gap to compensate these costs has been widening. Prior to the YPG, DAESH, a terrorist organization that was once very influential, controlled the exact same territory. The geopolitically advantageous status of this region was the main reason why DAESH operated there. In addition to non-state actors, the same areas have been attracting the attention of different regional and international powers. Therefore, the critical geopolitical significance of the YPG-controlled areas ought to be extensively analyzed so as to comprehend the struggle in the region and to be able to make more reliable assessments.

ABSTRACT This article discusses the growing religious nationalism in post-Soviet Georgia. It is argued that religious nationalism and the prioritisation of nation-state building are exercised at the expense of democracy and minority rights, and thus endanger national and territorial integrity. The article also aims to analyse the implementation of minority rights in Georgia which is elaborated in the context of the country's membership of the Council of Europe and international treaties to which it is a party. In this context, the deprivatisation of religion in Georgia is also discussed together with the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the public sphere.

Although not a reflection of liberal ideals, the Ottoman Empire had no official language policy or policies that standardized education. For the Ottoman rulers, the main aim was to maintain power and ensure the continuation of the Empire. However, the Turkish Republic ...

Crimean Tatars have been experiencing the loss of homeland since the Russian invasion of Crimea in 1783, which caused massive waves of migration especially to the Ottoman Empire. The loss of homeland culminated in Stalin's strategic deportations. Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea to Central Asia in 1944 and obtained the right to return to their homeland in 1989. Since then, the return process has continued. Considering that the construction of the myth of homeland is an effective instrument to mobilize national sentiment, this article studies the perception of homeland among Crimean Tatars with its different layers-as an essential marker of identity, as an idealized mythical final destination, as a land where the community lives, and finally as a rationally desired place in search for a better life. The article also argues that these layers may coexist in individual cases although their relative significance may vary.

The main intention of this article is to analyze the role of Islam in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and its utilization in the nation-building and state-building processes. It is argued that Islam in post-Soviet Kazakhstan is a cultural phenomenon rather than a religious one and is an important marker of national identity despite the competition of radical movements in the " religious field. " A situation of anomie became visible in Kazakhstan beginning in the Gorbachev period and increasingly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which necessitated a search for a new social order. Anomie, which was to a large extent the result of being in interaction with the dominant Russian culture and the oppressive Soviet regime, involved a feeling of despair that offered the opportunity of re-establishing the values and traditions of the past and new networks. Following independence, this feeling of despair, caused by the ethnocentric attitude of Russians who defined Kazak culture and nomadism as 'primitive' and wanted to replace it with a more 'civilized' modern Russian culture, was carefully elaborated by the Kazak elite aiming at building the Kazak nation. It is within this atmosphere of anomie that the cultural revival project has been launched. The revival of Islam is expected to play a significant role in this project and Islam is being used as one of the basic elements of culture that will contribute to the integration of the new Kazak national identity. Islam, in this context, is also used as a tool in the struggle against the Russian and Soviet heritage and is expected to play an integra-tive role. This integrative function is perceived as necessary for the construction of Kazak national identity. The cultural revival project in general and the revival of Islam in specific emerged as a reaction against the dominant Russian/Soviet culture and to a more limited extent the non-Kazaks, who are mainly Russians living in Kazakhstan. This reaction is in reality a nationalist reaction rather than a religious one. Religion in this case forms one of the basic elements of the cultural material that is going to be used to fill the content of the boundary of national identity. It is important to underline that the parallel revival of religion and nationalism is not a phenomenon specific to